William MATTISON III. Growing in Virtue: Aquinas on Habit. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023. Pp. 253. 49.95 pb. ISBN 978-1-64712-328-4. Reviewed by Michael G. LAWLER, Creighton University, Omaha, NE, 68178

With this book Mattison establishes himself in the first rank of both contemporary Thomists and theological ethicists. The central concept in the book, around which all else revolves, is the concept of habit that Mattison defines as a “stable specification of a person’s powers to do certain activities in certain ways” (p.7). As his analysis unfolds, he will correctly add to that definition that a habit is a stable specification of some personal power, with the involvement of reason. Repeated acts that entail the judgment of reason lead to habits/virtues; repeated acts that do not entail any judgment of reason lead to simple dispositions that are not fully virtuous. Lacking the use of reason, young children have no true virtuous habits, only learned dispositions from the repetition of culturally accustomed actions. Acquiring a habit that is a virtue is part of a development from childhood that involves the use of a person’s reason. That nurturing of that development from simple learned disposition to virtuous habit is an important goal of Catholic education. Habits are not natural; they are either learned by repetition with the involvement of reason or acquired by divine infusion. They qualify what already exists, namely, the person whose habits they are and the person’s natural powers. Hence it is common among virtue ethicists to refer to habits and virtue as “second nature.”

Mattison unfolds his treatment of habit and virtue in seven chapters.  Chapter One offers a Thomistic explanation of habits, situating them between the person and the persons’ virtuous activities. There is, therefore. a three-level scheme that is referred to throughout the book: the natural person, the habituated person, the habituated person’s activities. That scheme illustrates why habits are analogically referred to as “second nature.”  Chapter Two examines Aquinas’ neglected distinction between simple accustomed disposition and true habit. They are distinguished by both stability and the specification of end through rationality. Absent either condition, we have a simple leaned disposition and not a habit. Chapter Three examines two causes of dispositions and habits, nature and custom, which yields an extended discussion of the distinction between simple dispositions and true habits. This, in turn, and importantly, opens up a way to situate cultural structure and practice into every discussion about human agency. Chapter Four examines another cause of acquired habits and virtues, repeated human actions, “human” meaning actions engaging the human reason and will. This examination gives Mattison another opportunity to distinguish between virtuous habits and dispositions engendered by repeated actions. Chapter Five outlines the process of growing in acquired virtue and losing an already acquired virtue. As the described process applies also to the growth of vice, loss of virtue is tangential to growth of virtue in this treatment. Chapter Six is an important exposition of the need for a fourth cause of virtue, namely divine grace.  The infused virtues, like the acquired virtues, are habits, but they are habits directed toward a final end, and one of them, charity or love, informs and thus connects all virtues. Chapter Seven provides an account of growth in the infused virtues. An examination of the life of a child before she has reached the age of reason and the life of an adult who has reached the age of reason provides Mattison with the opportunity to explore the continuities and discontinuities between acquired and infused virtues. An important part of this chapter is its examination of the common phenomenon Mattison calls “dead faith.”

Mattison states at the beginning of the book that it is “geared toward scholars of morality and Aquinas” (p. 6), and the breadth, depth, and intricacy of his analysis ensures that it is not an easy read. It is, however, I would suggest to all lovers and seekers after virtue, a rewarding read in terms of what the reader will learn about habit and virtue and their sometimes surprising manifestations in human lives.